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tiary concepts-the burden of proof that applies to the action being
tried and presumptions. The burden of proof is examined first be-
cause presumptions can sometimes alter the burdens that the parties
must otherwise discharge if they are to avoid a nonsuit in a civil case.
Special attention is given to presumptions in criminal cases because of
the risk that their use against the accused might undermine the prose-
cution's burden to prove each element of the offense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
I. Burden of Proof
Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Uniform Rules of
Evidence contain any provisions defining and allocating the burden of
proof that applies in civil and criminal proceedings. The California
Evidence Code ("Code"), on the other hand, has a number of useful
provisions defining and allocating the burden of producing evidence
and the burden of persuasion.
California Evidence Code section 110 defines the burden of pro-
ducing evidence as the "obligation of a party to introduce evidence
sufficient to avoid a ruling against him on the issue."' Section 550, in
turn, allocates the production burden as to a particular fact "on the
party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the
absence of further evidence." 2
The burden of persuasion is defined by section 115 of the Code
as "the obligation of a party to establish by evidence a requisite degree
of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact .... -3This
section also defines the three standards of persuasion applicable in
California proceedings: proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
proof by clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.4 Unless otherwise provided by law, section 115 establishes
proof by a preponderance of the evidence as the default burden of
persuasion. 5
Section 500 allocates the burden of persuasion; unless otherwise
provided by law, the section allocates to a party the burden of persua-
sion on "each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential
to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting."6 However, the
1. CAL. EVIo. CODE § 110 (West 1995).
2. Id. § 550(a).
3. Id. § 115.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. § 500.
[Vol. 38
Code does not attempt to specify the facts that may be essential to a
party's claim for relief or defense. This task is left to the substantive
law, not the law of evidence. 7
With respect to criminal cases, section 501 provides that
"[i]nsofar as any statute, except [s]ection 522, assigns the burden of
proof in a criminal action, such statute is subject to Penal Code
[s]ection 1096. ''8 Section 1096 defines proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.9 Evidence Code section 522 places the persuasion burden on
the party claiming that any person, including him or herself, is or was
insane. 10 Both of these sections are subject to the command of In re
WinshipI I that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."1 2
The California Evidence Code places the burden of persuasion
on the party who claims that a person is guilty of a crime or wrongdo-
ing,13 or did not exercise a requisite degree of care.1 4 The Code also
places upon the state the burden of persuasion "on all issues relating
to the historic location of rivers, streams, and other water bodies and
the authority of the state in issuing the patent or grant," in any action
in which the state is a party "where (a) the boundary of land patented
or otherwise granted by the state is in dispute, or (b) the validity of
any state patent or grant dated prior to 1950 is in dispute . "..."15
Section 502 allocates to judges the duty of instructing the jurors
on which party bears the burden of persuasion.1 6 It mirrors the lan-
guage in section 115 regarding the accused's obligation to raise a rea-
sonable doubt about his or her guilt.17 Consistent with Winship's
mandate that the prosecution prove each element of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, one would expect a judge to in-
struct jurors of the accused's obligation to raise a reasonable doubt
about any of the elements. But as will be explained in the discussion
7. Id. § 500 law revision commission's cmt. ("The facts that must be shown to estab-
lish a cause of action or a defense are determined by the substantive law, not the law of
evidence.").
8. Id. § 501.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1997).
10. Id.
11. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
12. Id. at 364.
13. CAL. Evi. CODE § 520.
14. Id. § 521.
15. Id. § 523.
16. See id. § 502.
17. See id. §§ 115, 502.
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of presumptions, such an instruction can run afoul of Winship. The
accused has no such obligation, but does have the right if he or she
chooses to offer evidence that contests the prosecution's evidence.' 8
Consequently, the accused is not required to put on a case-in-chief
and may rest without doing so.19 Exercising this option does not di-
minish the prosecution's federal obligation to prove each element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Legislature
should delete language from sections 115 and 502 requiring "a party
to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or nonexistence
of a fact."'20
The major flaw in the California approach is the Code's insis-
tence on using the term "burden of proof' to refer to the persuasion
burden. In fact, the burden of proof consists of two distinct burdens-
the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion. 21
Practitioners who are unaware of the Code's unique use of the term
might be misled into believing that "burden of proof' refers to both
burdens. The Code's use of the term is not only limited to the chapter
on burden of proof,22 but is also used to refer to the burden of persua-
sion in the chapter on presumptions, 23 and thus can be the cause of
additional confusion.
Clarity can be achieved by adding a section to the Code that de-
fines the burden of proof as consisting of both the production and
persuasion burdens and by substituting "burden of persuasion" in
each instance in which the Code uses "burden of proof' to refer to
this burden.
As has been stated, the Federal Rules of Evidence lack any provi-
sions defining and allocating the production and persuasion burdens.
The California provisions are helpful to the bench and bar and, ex-
cept as noted, should be retained.
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093(c) (West Supp. 2003).
19. See id. This section requires that the prosecution present a case-in-chief in support
of the charge; the accused, however, is simply given the option of presenting a case-in-
chief; see also id. § 1118.1. If the prosecution makes out a prima facie case, the accused may
rest without opening a case-in-chief. If the prosecution fails to make out a prima facie case,
the court on its own motion or a defense motion must grant a judgment of acquittal. Id.
20. CAL. EVID. CODE § 115. The language in § 502 is almost identical.
21. See MIGUEL A. M9NDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL
RULES-A PROBLEM APPROACH § 18.01 (2d ed. 1999).
22. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE ch. 1, div. 5.
23. See generally id. ch. 3, div. 5.
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H. Presumptions and Inferences
A. Introduction
To understand the California and federal treatment of presump-
tions, a number of considerations must be kept in mind. First, pre-
sumptions must be distinguished from inferences. Second,
presumptions may be one of two kinds-rebuttable and conclusive.
Third, rebuttable presumptions may be classified as either the Thayer
or Morgan type. Finally, federal due process limits the use of presump-
tions and inferences in criminal cases.
The following three examples illustrate the differences between
inferences and presumptions and between Thayer and Morgan rebut-
table presumptions:
Example One-Inferences. Much has been made of inferences.
Simply put, they are the kind of conclusions we draw in everyday prob-
lem solving. Technically, they are deductions "of fact that may logi-
cally and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts
found or otherwise established in the action." 24
Assume a breach of contract action in which the plaintiff claims
that the defendant failed to perform as promised. The defendant's
position is that no contract existed because the plaintiff failed to ac-
cept the defendant's offer.
To prevail, the plaintiff must prove, among other matters, the ex-
istence of the contract. Since the existence of the contract is essential
to his breach claim, the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion on this
issue.2 5 Ultimately, the plaintiff must persuade the jurors of the con-
tract's existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 26 Moreover, the
plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence proving the exis-
tence of the contract. As noted above, under the Code, the produc-
tion burden is initially on the party having the persuasion burden on a
given issue. 27
The production burden imposes upon the plaintiff "the obliga-
tion ... to introduce evidence sufficient to avoid a ruling against him
on the issue."28 To avoid an adverse directed verdict at the conclusion
of his case-in-chief, the plaintiff must introduce some evidence of the
contract's existence. A sufficiency standard is used in ruling on mo-
24. Id. § 600(b). The Federal Rules do not have a provision defining inferences.
25. See id. § 500.
26. Id. § 115.
27. See id. § 550.
28. Id. § 110.
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tions for directed verdicts in order to vouchsafe a party's right to jury
determinations of material factual issues. 29 Under the sufficiency stan-
dard, the judge must deny the defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict and allow the issue of the contract's existence to go to the jury if
the judge concludes that a reasonable jury could find the contract
existed from the plaintiffs evidence if believed.
Assume that the defendant's assertion that no contract existed is
based on not receiving the plaintiffs written acceptance. In his case-
in-chief, the plaintiff produces evidence that he prepared a written
acceptance of the defendant's offer and asked his secretary to mail it
to the defendant at the address on the defendant's written offer. The
plaintiffs secretary testifies that he copied the defendant's name and
address from the offer, and after affixing the correct postage,
dropped the acceptance in the mailbox outside the office. Assume
that the law of contracts provides that an offer is not accepted unless
the acceptance is received by the offeror. At the conclusion of the
plaintiffs case-in-chief, should the judge grant the defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
produce any evidence that the defendant received the acceptance?
The judge shou!d deny the defendant's motion. In applying the
sufficiency standard, the judge must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. 30
This standard requires the judge to accept as true the evidence most
favorable to the plaintiff, to disregard conflicting evidence, and to
draw only those inferences from the evidence which are most
favorable to the plaintiff.31 In this hypothetical, the plaintiff has failed
to produce any direct evidence showing that the defendant received
the acceptance. However, an inference can be drawn that the defen-
dant received the acceptance because the acceptance letter was cor-
rectly addressed, had the appropriate postage, and was deposited with
the United States Postal Service. Since a reasonable jury could draw
this inference, the question of whether the defendant received the
acceptance should go to the jury.
29. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 581 (c) (West 1997); see also Salomons v. Lumsden, 213
P.2d 132, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); M9NDEZ, supra note 21, § 17.01 (discussing how the role
of the judge in screening evidence under CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE section 403 is simi-
larly circumscribed to vouchsafe a party's right to jury determinations of material factual
issues).
30. See Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 227 (Cal. 1982); Ewing v. Clover-
leaf Bowl, 572 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Cal. 1978).
31. See Campbell, 649 P.2d at 227; Ewing, 572 P.2d at 1157.
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Nonetheless, defeating the motion does not mean that the plain-
tiff prevails. In his case-in-chief, the defendant is entitled to produce
evidence that he did not receive the acceptance. Since the plaintiff
has the burden of persuasion on the contract's existence, the judge
must instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant unless the
plaintiff convinces them by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant received the acceptance. Whether the jurors find for the
plaintiff on this issue depends on their willingness to draw the very
inference drawn by the judge when ruling on the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict. Their willingness to do so depends in turn on
their assessment of all of the evidence, including the credibility of the
witnesses.
Example Two-Thayer Presumptions. In the example thus far,
the resolution of the plaintiffs breach action has not involved pre-
sumptions. Presumptions, however, can alter both the production and
persuasion burdens in a given action. However, it is important to note
that Thayer presumptions do not alter the burden of persuasion. To
explore the effects of presumptions, the following example applies
one to the plaintiff's case.
In ruling on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the
judge confronts the question of whether to rule in the defendant's
favor in light of the plaintiffs lack of direct evidence proving that the
defendant had received the plaintiffs acceptance. Because of the
strict limits imposed by the sufficiency standard, the judge has no
choice but to deny the defendant's motion-a reasonable jury could
find that the defendant received the acceptance if the plaintiffs evi-
dence is believed. The judge's task would be eased substantially if the
plaintiff could call to the judge's attention a presumption created by
the Evidence Code: "A letter correctly addressed and properly mailed
is presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail."32
Analysis shows that a Thayer presumption, like all presumptions,
consists of two elements: the basic facts and the presumed facts. 33 The
basic facts are that the plaintiff correctly addressed and properly
mailed a letter. The presumed fact is that such a letter is received in
the ordinary course of mail. In our example, the plaintiff offered evi-
32. CAL. EVID. CODE § 641.
33. See id. § 600(a) (defining a presumption as "an assumption of fact that the law
requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in
the action"). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not define a presumption. See also UNIV. R.
EvIo. 301 (1) (defining a basic fact as "a fact or group of facts that give rise to a presump-
tion"); R. 301 (3) (defining a presumed fact as "a fact that is assumed upon the finding of a
basic fact").
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dence of the basic facts. In denying the defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict, the judge must assume the truth of the plaintiffs
evidence. The judge has no choice but to assume the existence of the
presumed fact-namely, that the defendant received the plaintiffs ac-
ceptance in the ordinary course of mail. Since the presumed fact sup-
plies the very evidence the defendant claims is missing from the
plaintiff's case-in-chief, the judge must deny the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict.
A presumption, however, can have a life that extends beyond a
motion for a directed verdict. A presumption has the potential to alter
a jury's fact-finding function. Its effect depends on the kind of pre-
sumption involved and can best be seen by comparing a case without
presumptions with a case with presumptions. Take the breach of con-
tract case in which the plaintiff offers no direct evidence that the de-
fendant received the plaintiffs acceptance. In a world without
presumptions, if the defendant offers no evidence of failure to receive
the plaintiffs acceptance, the plaintiff can win only if the jury believes
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant received the
acceptance. This depends on the jury's willingness to draw the neces-
sary inference from the plaintiff's evidence. But in a world where pre-
sumptions operate, that mode of fact-finding can change. Under such
circumstances, the judge instructs the jury to find the presumed fact
(that the defendant received the acceptance in the ordinary course of
mail) if the jury first finds the basic facts (that the acceptance was
addressed correctly and mailed properly) .34 Only if the defendant
produces some evidence that he did not receive the acceptance does
the world revert to one without presumptions. In that situation, the
judge says nothing about the presumption and the jury is free to draw
whatever inferences it wishes from all of the evidence.3 5
It is crucial to note that the Thayer presumption we are consider-
ing does not alter the burden of persuasion. To prevail, the plaintiff
must still persuade the jurors by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant received the acceptance. But the presumption assists
the plaintiff in two respects. First, it helps him survive the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict since it relieves him of the need to pro-
duce direct evidence of the presumed fact. Second, where the defen-
dant produces no evidence that he failed to receive the acceptance,
the plaintiff gets the benefit of having the jurors instructed to find the
34. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 604 and assembly committee on judiciary's cmt.
35. See id.; see also Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 821 (Ct. App.
2000).
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presumed fact if they find the basic facts. But since the presumed fact
(that the acceptance was received in the ordinary course of mail) is
one of the elements the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence, the judge has to instruct the jurors to find the presumed
fact only if they first find the basic facts by that standard.
Example Three-Morgan Presumptions. Some presumptions,
however, do more than just affect the burden of producing evidence.
In particular, Morgan presumptions can shift the burden of persua-
sion on the existence of the presumed fact. The present example illus-
trates this important point.
Assume a personal injury action in which the plaintiff seeks to
recover for injuries she suffered when the defendant allegedly hit her
while driving a car at an excessive speed. To recover, the plaintiff must
prove, among other matters, that the defendant did not exercise the
degree of care required under the circumstances. Ordinarily, the
plaintiff has both the production and persuasion burdens on this is-
sue. 36 Assume that to avoid an adverse directed verdict on this issue,
the plaintiff offers evidence in her case-in-chief that the defendant was
driving in excess of the speed limit posted by a city ordinance. Since a
reasonable jury could draw an inference that the defendant did not
exercise the degree of care required under the circumstances, this evi-
dence allows the plaintiff to get to the jury under the directed verdict
standard on this issue. In a world without presumptions, the judge
simply instructs the jury to return a verdict for the defendant unless
the plaintiff convinces them by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant failed to exercise the degree of care required under the
circumstances.
Enter now the concept of negligence per se. The Evidence Code
provides that the failure to exercise due care is "presumed" if the per-
son violates an ordinance that, among other matters, is designed to
prevent the kind of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.37 Unlike the
Thayer presumption, the Morgan presumption alters the burden of
persuasion.3 8 The burden shifts to the defendant to convince the jury
by a preponderance of the evidence that he exercised due care, i.e.,
that his violation of the ordinance was reasonable and justified under
the circumstances. 9
36. CAL. EVID. COIE §§ 521, 550.
37. Id. § 669(a).
38. See id. § 669.
39. See id. law revision commission's cmt.
Fall 2003]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
This presumption does not alter the plaintiff's burden in proving
the basic facts. 40 Since the presumed fact is one of the elements of the
plaintiff's cause of action, the plaintiff must still establish the basic
facts by at least a preponderance of the evidence. At the close of the
evidence, the judge instructs the jurors to find the presumed fact
(that the defendant was negligent) if they first find the basic facts by
this standard. In addition, the judge instructs the jury to find for the
plaintiff on this issue unless the defendant persuades them of the non-
existence of the presumed fact by a preponderance of the evidence. 41
The effects of the presumptions in examples Two and Three can
be summarized as follows in an action in which the plaintiff must
prove element B by a preponderance of the evidence and in which B
is also a presumed fact:
Example-Thayer presumption: (1) If the plaintiff establishes
the basic facts by a sufficiency standard, the judge must deny the de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict based on the absence of evi-
dence of B. (2) If the defendant fails to introduce any evidence
disproving B, then the judge instructs the jurors to find B if they first
find the basic facts by the standard of persuasion that applies to the
action. (3) But, if the defendant disproves B by a sufficiency standard,
the judge says nothing to the jurors about the presumption.
Example-Morgan presumption: (1) If the plaintiff establishes
the basic facts by a sufficiency standard, the judge must deny the de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict based on the absence of evi-
dence of B. (2) If the defendant fails to introduce any evidence
disproving B, then the judge instructs the jurors to find B if they first
find the basic facts by the standard of persuasion that applies to the
action. (3) But, if the defendant disproves B by a sufficiency standard,
the judge directs the jurors to find B if they first find the basic facts by
the appropriate standard, unless the defendant persuades them of B's
nonexistence by the applicable persuasion standard.
Both Thayer and Morgan presumptions are advantageous to the
party in whose favor they operate. The Morgan presumption is more
beneficial, since it shifts to the opposing party the burden of disprov-
ing the presumed fact. Since their effects differ, it is important to dis-
40. The basic facts are whether the defendant violated the ordinance and whether the
violation contributed to or caused the plaintiffs injuries. See id. law revision commission's
cmt. (explaining that whether the ordinance was designed to prevent the injury the plain-
tiff complains of and whether the plaintiff was among the class of persons for whose protec-
tion the ordinance was adopted are questions for the judge, not the jury).
41. See id. § 606 and assembly committee on judiciary's cmt.
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tinguish whether a given presumption is of the first or second type.
The Thayer presumption derives from California Evidence Code sec-
tions 603 and 604, the Morgan Presumption, from sections 605 and
606. Understanding the origin of these Code sections aids in distin-
guishing between the two types of presumptions.
B. Distinguishing Between Rebuttable Presumptions
The two types of presumptions described in the previous section
are known as rebuttable presumptions. 42 The opposing party is enti-
tled to introduce evidence "rebutting" the presumed fact by offering
evidence disproving the presumed fact. Returning to the second ex-
ample introducing Thayer presumptions, the defendant could under-
mine the presumed fact (that the plaintiff's acceptance was received
in the ordinary course of mail) by evidence that he did not receive the
acceptance.
43
Over one hundred years ago, Professor James Thayer described
the first kind of presumption, the one found in sections 603 and 604
of the Code. He believed that a presumption merely shifted to the
opposing party the burden of producing evidence rebutting the pre-
sumed fact.44 If the opposing party produced sufficient evidence to
persuade the judge of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, then
the presumption "burst" and the jury was told nothing about the pre-
sumption.45 Half a century later, Professor Edmund Morgan chal-
lenged Thayer's view of presumptions. Professor Morgan believed that
presumptions should also shift to the opposing party the burden of
persuading the jurors of the nonexistence of the presumed fact.46 Ac-
cording to Professor Morgan, producing sufficient evidence of the
nonexistence of the presumed fact was not enough; the jury should be
42. See id § 602 ("A statute providing that a fact or group of facts is prima facie evi-
dence of another fact establishes a rebuttable presumption.").
43. See United Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Reeder Dev. Corp., 129 Cal. Rptr. 113, 124 (Ct.
App. 1976). The opponent can also attack the basic facts by evidence of their nonexis-
tence. In the example above, the defendant could challenge the basic facts by evidence, for
instance, that the plaintiff's secretary admitted prior to the trial to having no recollection
of having mailed the acceptance. As will be seen, however, introducing evidence of the
nonexistence of the basic facts does not dispel (rebut) the presumed fact. Such evidence
simply places upon the jury the burden of determining the existence of the basic facts. Id.
44. SeeJAMEs THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 346
(1898); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
45. See THAYER, supra note 44, at 346 (explaining that when "other facts" rebutting the
presumption are introduced, "[a]ll is then turned into an ordinary question of evidence,
and . . .the rule of presumption has vanished").
46. See EDMUND MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN Sys-
TEM OF LITIGATION 80-81 (1956).
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instructed to find the presumed fact unless persuaded otherwise by
the opposing party under the appropriate persuasion standard. 47
Unlike Professor Thayer, who viewed presumptions mainly as a
device for allocating the burden of producing evidence supporting
the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact, Professor Morgan
recognized that presumptions often reflect the considerations of fair-
ness, policy, and probability that initially allocate the various elements
of any case between the plaintiffs prima facie case and the defen-
dant's affirmative defenses.48 In his view, if these considerations war-
rant imposing the risk of nonpersuasion on the party with the burden
of producing evidence on a given element, then those same consider-
ations should place the risk of nonpersuasion on the party with the
burden of producing evidence rebutting the presumed fact.49
Dean Charles McCormick noted that the kinds of presumptions
Professor Morgan had in mind often advance desirable social goals,
irrespective of whether the presumed fact has an underlying basis in
probability and logical inference. 50 An example is the presumption
that a person not heard from in five years is dead. 51 Though the pre-
sumption of death from a five-year absence may conflict with the infer-
ence that life continues for its normal expectancy, the policies
favoring distributing estates, settling titles, and permitting life to pro-
ceed normally justify the presumption.5 2
Faced with two opposing views of presumptions, the framers of
the California Evidence Code opted to adopt both. Sections 603-604
describe Thayer presumptions while sections 606-607 describe Mor-
gan ones. Presumptions, however, whether created by statute or case
law, do not usually indicate whether they come within Thayer's or
Morgan's view. In the absence of an explicit classification, the judge
must decide whether a given presumption is designed to promote
some social policy (and hence is governed by sections 606-607) or
merely to facilitate the allocation of the production burden with re-
spect to the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact (and
hence is governed by sections 603-604).
According to the Law Revision Commission, section 603:
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 827-28 (Edward Cleary ed.,
2d ed. 1972).
51. CAL. EVID. CODE § 667 (West 1995).
52. See id. §§ 667 law revision commission's cmt., 605 law revision commission's cmt.
[Vol. 38
PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
[P] resumptions are designed to dispense with unnecessary proof of
facts that are likely to be true if not disputed. Typically, such pre-
sumptions are based on an underlying logical inference. In some
cases, the presumed fact is so likely to be true and so little likely to
be disputed that the law requires it to be assumed in the absence of
contrary evidence. In other cases, evidence of the nonexistence of
the presumed fact, if there is any, is so much more readily available
to the party against whom the presumption operates that he is not
permitted to argue that the presumed fact does not exist unless he
is willing to produce such evidence. In still other cases, there may
be no direct evidence of the existence or nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact; but, because the case must be decided, the law requires
a determination that the presumed fact exists in light of common
experience indicating that it usually exists in such cases .... Typi-
cal of such presumptions are the presumption that a mailed letter
was received . . . and presumptions relating to the authenticity of
documents . . .53
Section 605 presumptions, on the other hand, are established to
effectuate some public policy other than, or in addition to, facilitating
the trial of actions. 54
What makes a presumption one affecting the burden of [persua-
sion] is the fact that there is always some further reason of policy
for the establishment of the presumption. It is the existence of this
further basis in policy that distinguishes a presumption affecting
the burden of [persuasion] from a presumption affecting the bur-
den of producing evidence . . . .Frequently, too, a presumption
affecting the burden of [persuasion] will have an underlying basis
in probability and logical inference. For example, the presumption
of the validity of a ceremonial marriage may be based in part on
the probability that most marriages are valid. However, an underly-
ing logical inference is not essential. In fact, the lack of underlying
inference is a strong indication that the presumption affects the
burden of [persuasion]. Only the needs of public policy can justify
the direction of a particular presumption that is not warranted by
the application of probability and common experience to the
known facts.
55
To help parties and judges distinguish between section 603
(Thayer) and section 605 (Morgan) presumptions, the Code provides
a list of common presumptions. Section 603 presumptions include the
following: "[m] oney delivered by one to another is presumed to have
been due to the latter";5 6 "[a] thing delivered ... to another is pre-
sumed to have belonged to the latter";57 "[a] n obligation delivered up
53. Id. § 603 law revision commission's cmt.
54. See id. § 605 and law revision commission's cmt.
55. Id. § 605 law revision commission's cmt.
56. Id. § 631.
57. Id. § 632.
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to the debtor is presumed to have been paid";58 "[a] person in posses-
sion of an order on himself for the payment of money, or delivery of a
thing, is presumed to have paid the money or delivered the thing ac-
cordingly";59 "[a] n obligation possessed by the creditor is presumed
not to have been paid";60 "[t]he payment of earlier rent or install-
ments is presumed from a receipt for later rent or installments"; 61
"[t] he things which a person possesses are presumed to be owned by
him";62 "a person who exercises acts of ownership over property is pre-
sumed to be the owner of it";6 3 "[a] judgment, when not conclusive, is
presumed to correctly determine or set forth the rights of the parties,
but there is no presumption that the facts essential to the judgment
have been correctly determined";64 "[a] writing is presumed to have
been truly dated";65 "[a] letter correctly addressed and properly
mailed is presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of
mail";66 "[a] trustee or other person, whose duty it was to convey real
property to a particular person, is presumed to have actually conveyed
to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect title of such
person or his successor in interest";67 "a deed or will or other writing
purporting to create, terminate, or affect an interest in real or per-
sonal property is presumed to be authentic if it [i]s at least 30 years
old; is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its au-
thenticity; [w]as kept, or if found was found, in a place where such
writing, if authentic, would be likely to be kept or found, and [h]as
been generally acted upon as authentic by persons having an interest
in the matter" ;68 "[a] book, purporting to be printed or published by
public authority, is presumed to have been so printed or published";69
"[a] book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in the
tribunals of the state or nation where the book is published, is pre-
sumed to contain correct reports of such cases";70 "[p]rinted materi-
als, purporting to be a particular newspaper or periodical, are
58. Id. § 633.
59. Id. § 634.
60. Id. § 635.
61. Id. § 636.
62. Id. § 637.
63. Id. § 638.
64. Id. § 639.
65. Id. § 640.
66. Id. § 641.
67. Id. § 642.
68. Id. § 643.
69. Id. § 644.
70. Id. § 645.
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presumed to be that newspaper or periodical if regularly issued at av-
erage intervals not exceeding three months";71 the defendant in a per-
sonal injury action is presumed to have been negligent if the plaintiff
establishes the conditions giving rise to the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur;72 and the facts stated by a registered process server in his return
are presumed to be true.73
Section 605 (Morgan) presumptions include the following:
"[t] he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner
of the full beneficial title";74 "[a] ceremonial marriage is presumed to
be valid";75 official duties are presumed to have been regularly per-
formed; 76 "[a] person is presumed to intend the ordinary conse-
quences of his voluntary act";77 any California or federal court or any
court of general jurisdiction, acting as such, is presumed to have acted
in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction when the act of the court is
under collateral attack;7 "[a] person not heard from in five years is
presumed to be dead";79 "an unlawful intent is presumed from the
doing of an unlawful act";80 the defendant in a personal injury action
is presumed to have been negligent if the plaintiff establishes the con-
ditions giving rise to the doctrine of negligence per se; 1 and any ordi-
nance enacted by local government entities limiting the number of
building permits for residential construction or changing the stan-
dard of residential development on vacant land is presumed to have
an impact on the supply of residential units.82
71. Id § 645.1.
72. See id. § 646(c).
73. See id. § 647.
74. Id. § 662. This presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Id.
75. Id. § 663.
76. Id. § 664. This presumption does not apply to the lawfulness of an arrest if it is
found or otherwise established that the arrest was made without a warrant. Id.
77. Id. § 665. SeeSandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), remanded to 603 P.2d 244
(Mont. 1979) (striking a similar presumption as unconstitutional); see also infra text accom-
panying note 112; CAL. EvID. CODE § 665 (explaining that this presumption is inapplicable
in a criminal action to prove the specific intent of the accused where specific intent is an
element of the offense charged).
78. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 666.
79. Id. § 667.
80. Id. § 668. See infta text accompanying note 112, for a discussion of the constitu-
tionality of this presumption. This presumption is inapplicable in a criminal action to es-
tablish the accused's specific intent where that intent is an element of the crime charged.
Id. § 668.
81. See id. § 669. See id. § 669.1 for additional limitations on this presumption.
82. Id. § 669.5. See id. for additional limitations on this presumption.
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C. Conclusive Presumptions
The California Evidence Code also recognizes the existence of
conclusive presumptions.83 These differ from rebuttable presump-
tions in one crucial respect: the judge must tell the jurors that if they
find the basic facts by the requisite standard, they must find the pre-
sumed fact irrespective of the strength of the opposing evidence. 84
In rare instances, however, courts decline to apply conclusive pre-
sumptions where doing so defeats the policies supporting them. An
example is the presumption that, subject to certain limitations, the
issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or
sterile, is the child of the marriage.8 5 In County of Orange v. Leslie B. ,86
a biological father sought to use this presumption to avoid supporting
his child. At the time he fathered the child, the mother was married to
and living with another man who subsequently divorced her. Since the
policies underlying the presumption-to preserve the integrity of the
family unit, protect children from the legal and social stigma of illegit-
imacy, and promote individual rather than state responsibility for
child support-would not be served by applying the presumption, the
court declined to do so. 8 7
Among the conclusive presumptions listed in the Code are the
following: "[t]he facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively
presumed to be true as between the parties thereto, or their succes-
sors in interest, [but not facts in] the recital of ... consideration";88
"whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing [is] true and
to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such
statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it";89 and "[a] tenant is
not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the com-
mencement of the relation."90
83. See id. §§ 601, 620.
84. See id. § 601 law revision commission's cmt. For examples of conclusive presump-
tions in criminal cases, see infra note 114.
85. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540-41 (West 1994). CAL. Evin. CODE § 621 created this
exception. It was repealed in 1994 and placed in the Family Code without substantive
change.
86. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (Ct. App. 1993).
87. See id. at 801; see also Comino v. Kelley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 731 (Ct. App. 1994)
(refusing to apply the presumption where the mother sought to have the presumption
applied against her husband in order to defeat the claims of the biological father who was
the only father the child knew).
88. CAL. EVID. CODE § 622.
89. Id. § 623.
90. Id. § 624.
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The last two examples aptly illustrate the Law Revision Commis-
sion's observation about conclusive presumptions: they "are not evi-
dentiary rules so much as they are rules of substantive law."9 1
D. Presumptions Under the Federal Rules
As submitted by the United ,States Supreme Court, the Federal
Rules of Evidence adopted Morgan's view of presumptions in civil
cases. 92 The original rule placed on "the opposing party the burden of
establishing the nonexistence of the presumed fact, once the party
invoking the presumption established the basic facts giving rise to
it."9 3 The Advisory Committee favored Morgan over Thayer presump-
tions on the ground that Thayer presumptions accorded "presump-
tions too 'slight and evanescent' an effect."94 But Congress changed
the recommended rule and instead adopted a variant of Thayer's view
of presumptions. Federal Rule of Evidence 301 "imposes on the party
against whom [the presumption] is directed the burden of going for-
ward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not
shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast."9 5
But the instructions given to the jury about the effect of the pre-
sumption differ from those given under the Code with respect to
Thayer presumptions. In California, if the opponent disproves the
presumed fact by a sufficiency standard, the presumption disappears,
and the judge will tell the jury nothing about the presumption. 96 But
under the Federal Rules, the judge may "instruct the jury that it may
infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic
facts."9 7 In effect, the judge is permitted to treat a rebutted presump-
tion as an inference.9 8 Where the opponent fails to produce evidence
rebutting the presumption, California judges will instruct the jurors to
91. Id. § 620 law revision commission's cmt.
92. FED. R. EVIn. 301 report of senate committee on the judiciary.
93. Id.
94. Id. advisory committee's note, deleted and superseded materials (West 2002-03).
The Uniform Rules of Evidence also adopt Professor Morgan's view of presumptions. See
UNIF. R. EvI. 302(a) ("In a civil action or proceeding, unless otherwise provided by stat-
ute,judicial decision, or these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more proba-
ble than its existence.").
95. FED. R. EvID. 301.
96. See supra text accompanying note 34.
97. FED. R. EVIr. 301 conference report.
98. See supra text accompanying note 31 for a discussion of inferences.
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find the presumed fact if they first find the basic facts by the appropri-
ate persuasion standard.99 Federal judges, however, give a more lim-
ited instruction. They will instruct the jurors that they "may presume
the existence of the presumed fact" if they find the basic facts. 100 The
use of the permissive "may" might suggest to some that an inference is
intended and not a Thayer presumption, despite the use of the term
"presume."
Rule 301 presumptions apply in all civil actions and proceedings
unless a different presumption is prescribed by an Act of Congress or
the Rules.10' An Act of Congress can include presumptions created by
courts construing federal statutes. 10 2 Rule 301 presumptions may not
apply to cases governed by Erie.103 Rule 302 provides that "the effect of
a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision is deter-
mined in accordance with State law."1 0 4
E. Comparison of California and Federal Presumptions
California should retain its approach to presumptions. The Advi-
sory Committee was wrong in rejecting the utility of Thayer presump-
tions. They are useful in dispensing with unnecessary proof of facts
that are likely to be true as a matter of logic if not disputed.10 5 Simi-
larly, Congress was mistaken in rejecting Morgan presumptions and
opting instead for a modified form of Thayer presumptions. Courts,
and especially legislatures, should be free to create presumptions that
advance public policy. The Code recognizes that presumptions are
created for a variety of reasons and that "no single theory or rationale
of presumptions can deal adequately with all of them." 10' 6
Allowing both types of presumptions does raise the problem of
distinguishing between them. It may not always be readily apparent to
the parties and the judge whether a presumption has been "estab-
lished to implement some public policy other than to facilitate the
determination of the particular action in which the presumption is"
99. See supra text accompanying note 33.
100. See FED. R. EVID. 301 conference report.
101. See id. R. 301.
102. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971), for an example of the
Morgan type presumption created by the United States Supreme Court in disparate impact
cases brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
103. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
104. FED. R. EVID. 302.
105. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 604 assembly committee on judiciary's cmt. (West 1995).
106. Id. § 601 law revision commission's cmt.
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invoked.10 7 But the cases construing the Code do not disclose reasons
for undue concern. It may be that the Code's useful listing of com-
mon Thayer and Morgan presumptions has substantially reduced the
potential for disputes in distinguishing between the two kinds of
presumptions.
The Code's approach to presumptions is flawed in one respect.
In defining Morgan presumptions, section 605 uses the term "burden
of proof" 0 8 to mean the "burden. of persuasion." As mentioned
above,10 9 the burden of proof consists of two distinct burdens-the
burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion.1 10 Prac-
titioners who are unaware of the Code's unusual use of the term
might be misled into believing that "burden of proof' refers to both
burdens. As has been suggested, clarity can be achieved by including a
new section which defines the burden of proof as consisting of both
the production and persuasion burdens and by substituting "burden
of persuasion" in each instance in which the Code uses "burden of
proof' to refer to this burden."' 1
F. Presumptions in Criminal Cases
When the United States Supreme Court held in In re Winship that
due process requires the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the Court laid the basis for a constitutional
attack on any presumption that threatens to lighten the prosecution's
burden of proof.1 12 Thus far, the Court has struck two kinds of pre-
sumptions as unconstitutional-conclusive presumptions and rebutta-
ble Morgan presumptions. 1 3
Conclusive presumptions are unconstitutional because they re-
lieve the prosecution from proving the presumed fact beyond a rea-
107. Id. § 60E.
108. Id. § 606.
109. See supra text accompanying note 21.
110. See id.
111. Sections that would have to be amended in the California Evidence Code include
section 601 (classifying presumptions), section 605 (defining Morgan type presumptions),
section 606 (describing the effect of Morgan type presumptions), and section 607 (describ-
ing the effect of Morgan type presumptions in criminal cases). In addition, the comments
to sections 601, 603, 605, and 606 also need to be changed in each instance in which
"burden of proof" refers to "burden of persuasion."
112. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
113. For a discussion of the nature of conclusive presumptions, see supra text accompa-
nying note 83; of Morgan presumptions, see supra text accompanying note 36.
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sonable doubt. 114 They impermissibly withdraw the issue of the
existence of the presumed fact from the jury 1 5 and prevent the ac-
cused from raising a reasonable doubt about the existence of the pre-
sumed fact.
For example, assume that an offense consists of elements A and
B. If the judge instructs the jurors that if they find A, they must find B,
then the prosecution is relieved of its Winship obligation of proving B
beyond a reasonable doubt. The jurors are not given an opportunity
to determine the existence of B, and the accused is prevented from
winning an acquittal by raising a reasonable doubt about the existence
of B. Instructing the jurors that they must first find A beyond a reason-
able doubt will not cure the constitutional infirmity. The prosecution
is still relieved of its Winship burden of proving B beyond a reasonable
doubt; the jurors are still denied a chance to consider the existence of
B; and the accused is still deprived of an opportunity to raise a reason-
able doubt about the existence of a fact essential to conviction. 116
Rebuttable presumptions of the Morgan variety have also been
declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court." 7 As-
sume again that an offense consists of elements A and B. If the judge
instructs the jurors that if they find A, they must find B unless the
accused disproves B at least by a preponderance of the evidence, then
the presumption shifts the burden of disproving an element of the
114. See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937
(1989). The United States Supreme Court struck as unconstitutional two California conclu-
sive presumptions. One presumption required the jurors to find that a person intended to
commit theft by fraud if, following the expiration of the lease or rental agreement, the
person failed to return leased or rented personal property within twenty days after the
owner demanded its return by certified or registered mail; the other required the jurors to
find that a lessee embezzled a vehicle if the lessee willfully or intentionally failed to return
the vehicle to its owner within five days of the expiration of the lease or rental agreement.
See id. at 264-66; see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979), remanded to 603
P.2d 244 (Mont. 1979). The presumption stricken in Sandstrom provided that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." Id., 442
U.S. at 512. Cf CAL. EVID. CODE § 665 ("A person is presumed to intend the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act.").
115. See Carella, 491 U.S. at 266.
116. See People v. Forrester, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 21 (Ct. App. 1994), for an example of
a conclusive presumption stricken as unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court,
where the court disapproved a presumption that required the jurors to find that a defen-
dant who fails to appear within fourteen days of the date assigned for his or her appear-
ance intends to evade the process of the court.
117. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523. In Sandstrom, the Court referred to Morgan type
presumptions as "mandatory presumption[s]." Id. at 515. In Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307 (1985), the Court used the term "mandatory presumptions" to refer to Morgan type
and conclusive presumptions. See id. at 314 n.2.
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offense to the accused. As the Court held in Sandstrom v. Montana,
Winship is violated because the prosecution is relieved of proving B
beyond a reasonable doubt.118 Winship is also violated because the ac-
cused is burdened with disproving B by a standard higher than that of
merely raising a reasonable doubt about the existence of the pre-
sumed fact.
So long as the presumption requires the accused to disprove B by
at least a preponderance of the evidence, instructing the jurors that
they must find B beyond a reasonable doubt will not remedy the prob-
lem. Such instructions would be hopelessly conflicting. Belief beyond
a reasonable doubt necessarily vanishes when the fact-finder enter-
tains a reasonable doubt about the matter.
The California Supreme Court has applied Sandstrom broadly.
The courts have held that the presumption is not saved even when the
jurors are informed that the accused's only obligation is to raise a rea-
sonable doubt about the existence of the presumed fact. 119 Jurors
might construe such an instruction as compelling them to find the
presumed fact as a matter of law when the accused fails to offer evi-
dence rebutting the presumed fact, and as a logical matter, the basic
facts do not compel the finding of the presumed fact.120 As the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stressed in People v. Roder, "[if that was the
jury's understanding, the presumption would not have operated
merely as a permissive inference." 121
In Roder, the court, in effect, construed California Evidence Code
section 607 as creating merely permissive inferences. 122 Section 607
provides:
When a presumption affecting the burden of [persuasion] oper-
ates in a criminal action to establish presumptively any fact that is
essential to the defendant's guilt, the presumption operates only if
the facts that give rise to the presumption have been found or oth-
erwise established beyond a reasonable doubt and, in such case,
the defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt as to the exis-
tence of the presumed fact.1 2 3
To prevent jurors from being compelled to find the presumed
fact as a matter of law if the accused fails to introduce evidence dis-
proving the presumed fact, the judge should tell the jurors only that
118. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523-24.
119. People v. Roder, 658 P.2d 1302, 1311 (Cal. 1983).
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1309 &-n.l.
123. CAL. EVID. Corw § 607 (West 1995).
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they may find the presumed fact from the basic facts. The permissive
language would thus reduce the presumption to a permissive infer-
ence. Instructions on permissive inferences can satisfy federal due
process requirements if the inference meets certain sufficiency
standards. 124
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the
constitutionality of Thayer type presumptions. 125 These require the
judge to instruct the jurors to find the presumed fact if they find the
basic facts but only if the opponent fails to introduce any evidence
contradicting the presumed fact.126 Though the matter was not
presented in these terms in Roder, the court's language embraces this
kind of presumption. Such a presumption could compel the jurors to
find the presumed fact as a matter of law even if the basic facts do not
compel a finding of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Clearly, such a presumption would not operate "merely as a permis-
sive inference."
California presumptions: competency to stand trial and insanity.
Under the California Penal Code, a person who is "mentally incompe-
tent" cannot be tried on a criminal charge.' 27 A person is mentally
incompetent "if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disa-
bility, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the crimi-
nal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a
rational manner." 28 The burden of persuasion on the issue of compe-
tency is placed on the defendant: "It shall be presumed that the defen-
dant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent."' 29
In Medina v. California,130 the United States Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of this presumption. Since the issues de-
124. The probative value of the circumstantial evidence giving rise to the inference
must be such as to move a reasonable juror to find the inference beyond a reasonable
doubt. See MENDEZ, supra note 21, § 18.09.
125. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 515 (1979), remanded to 603 P.2d 244 (Mont.
1979) (finding it unnecessary to pass on Thayer type presumptions). But see Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985). Language in Francis could be construed to prohibit
instructing juries on Thayer type presumptions where the accused fails to rebut the pre-
sumed fact: "A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed
fact if the State proves certain predicate facts." Id.
126. If the opponent introduces evidence contradicting the presumed fact, then the
judge will say nothing to the jury about the presumption. For an extended discussion of
Thayer presumptions, see supra text accompanying note 33.
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 2000).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 1369(f).
130. 505 U.S. 437 (1992), reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1244 (1992).
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cided at a competency hearing are separate from those determined at
the trial on the issue of guilt, the concerns raised by Winship and Sand-
strom are not implicated. The focus is not on whether the procedures
governing competency hearings relieve the prosecution from proving
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt but on
whether the procedures satisfy due process. Because the California
procedures entitle the defendant to the assistance of counsel and re-
quire the use of psychiatric evidence to determine the defendant's
mental condition,' 31 the Medina Court found that the Penal Code pro-
visions were "constitutionally adequate" to guard against trying an in-
competent defendant. 13 2
The Evidence Code places upon the "party claiming that any per-
son, including himself, is or was insane . . . the burden of proof on
that issue."' 3 3 The Penal Code, in turn, places upon the accused the
burden of proving his or her insanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 134 Placing the burden of persuasion on the accused does not
violate due process so long as the jury first finds that all of the ele-
ments of the offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.t 35
The Penal Code provides that during the guilt phase the accused
is to be "conclusively presumed" to have been sane at the time the
offense was allegedly committed. 13 6 This presumption does not violate
Winship since it does not relieve the prosecution from proving the
mens rea of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and does not pre-
clude the accused from offering evidence of mental disorders to dis-
prove the existence of the mens rea.137
Federal criminal presumptions. As submitted by the United States
Supreme Court, the Federal Rules of Evidence had a provision on
criminal presumptions that, among other matters, required the judge
to instruct the jurors to disregard the presumed fact if it established
guilt or an element of the offense, or disproved a defense, unless the
jurors found from all the evidence the presumed fact beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 38 The House Committee on the Judiciary deleted this
rule because of its intention to study criminal presumptions in con-
131. See id. at 450.
132. Id. at 453.
133. CAL. EVID. CODE § 522 (West 1995).
134. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b).
135. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952), reh' denied, 344 U.S. 848 (1952).
136. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a).
137. Id.
138. FE). R. EVID. 303 deleted and superseded materials.
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nection with several bills on revising the federal criminal code.139 The
Senate concurred with the House deletion. 40
With some changes in the language, the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence adopted the provision submitted by the United States Supreme
Court. 141
HI. Recommendations
First, the California Evidence Code should retain provisions de-
fining and allocating the production and persuasion burdens, in spite
of the fact that the Federal Rules do not contain any provisions con-
cerning these matters. The Code's provisions provide useful guidance
to the bench and bar.
Second, the Code's current use of the term "burden of proof" to
refer only to the burden of persuasion should be discontinued since it
causes uncertainty in terminology. Rather, the Code should employ
the term "burden of persuasion" whenever the reference is to this
burden.
Third, the Code's provisions regarding presumptions should be
retained. The Federal Advisory Committee was wrong in rejecting
Thayer type presumptions, and Congress was mistaken in rejecting
Morgan type presumptions, opting instead for a variant of Thayer pre-
sumptions. The Code recognizes the distinct advantages offered by
both Thayer and Morgan presumptions.
Finally, section 607, which governs presumptions in California
criminal cases, should either be deleted as unnecessary given the
United States Supreme Court's decisions on presumptions or be re-
written to create only a permissive inference as prescribed by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Roder.
139. Id. report of house committee on the judiciary.
140. Id.
141. See UNIF. R. EVID. 303.
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